This study expands the application of deonance theory into organizations’ upper echelons by examining how CEOs imprinted with a sense of duty can influence managerial decision-making. We hypothesize an imprint of bounded autonomy, an ought-force that constrains their decision-making and understanding of behavioral freedom, influences duty-bound CEOs to self-report errors in past financial reporting. We test deonance theory propositions of instrumentality for behavioral expansion, namely loss avoidance and gain attainment, related to institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership. We use (...) CEOs that are graduates of U.S. service academies as a proxy for duty-bound executives and find firms they lead are more likely to issue a financial restatement to correct a previous reporting error. This finding is robust to alternate explanations such as being error-prone, earnings management, auditor oversight, and risk behaviors. We also find evidence that deonance may be subject to behavioral expansion. The likelihood of issuing a restatement decreases as institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership increases. This study shows imprinted deonance within the C-suite influences important organizational outcomes. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded disengagement from the (...) task and a pre-occupation with one's task performance that seems to be best conceptualised as a strategic attempt to deploy attentional resources in response to a perception of environmental demands which exceed ones ability to perform the task. The implications of these findings for our understanding of how awareness is maintained on task relevant material during periods of sustained attention are discussed. (shrink)

When ethics committees are consulted about patients who have or need court-appointed guardians, they lack empirical evidence about several common issues, including the relationship between guardianship and prolonged, potentially medically unnecessary hospitalizations for patients. To provide information about this issue, we conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses using a retrospective cohort from Veterans Healthcare Administration. To examine the relationship between guardianship appointment and hospital length of stay, we first compared 116 persons hospitalized prior to guardianship appointment to a comparison group (n (...) = 348) 3:1 matched for age, diagnosis, date of admission, and comorbidity. We then compared 91 persons hospitalized in the year following guardianship appointment to a second matched comparison group (n = 273). Mean length of stay was 30.75 days (SD = 46.70) amongst those admitted prior to guardianship, which was higher than the comparison group (M = 7.74, SD = 9.71, F = 20.75, p. (shrink)

Do the rich descriptions and narrative shapings of literature provide a valuable resource for readers, writers, philosophers, and everyday people to imagine and confront the ultimate questions of life? Do the human activities of storytelling and complex moral decision-making have a deep connection? What are the moral responsibilities of the artist, critic, and reader? What can religious perspectives—from Catholic to Protestant to Mormon—contribute to literary criticism? Thirty well known contributors reflect on these questions, including iterary theorists Marshall Gregory, James Phelan, (...) and Wayne Booth; philosophers Martha Nussbaum, Richard Hart, and Nina Rosenstand; and authors John Updike, Charles Johnson, Flannery O'Connor, and Bernard Malamud. Divided into four sections, with introductory matter and questions for discussion, this accessible anthology represents the most crucial work today exploring the interdisciplinary connections between literature, religion and philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Faulkner's Novels Past and PresentAndrew J. McKenna (bio)This article contains instances of the N-word. The Editor, Michigan State University Press, and Michigan State University do not condone the use of this word and only after careful consideration have we reprinted it. In this case, the word appears in the context of works by Faulkner.When I first came East I kept thinking You've got to remember to think of some (...) of them as coloured people not niggers, … I learned that the best way to take all people, black or white, is to take them for what they think they are, and leave them alone. That was when I realized that a nigger is not a person so much as a form of behavior; a sort of obverse reflection of the white people he lives among.—Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury ([1929] 2019, 45)A black man is a person who must ride Jim Crow in Georgia.—W. E. B. Du Bois ([1940] 1992, 153)When William Faulkner memorably stated, "the past is not dead, it's not even past," he was not reaching out for a place in the world-historical pantheon of aphoristic wisdom; he wasn't thinking about culture and history in general. A person of his own time and place, he was thinking about his experience in his own homeland, the deep South of his native [End Page 39] Mississippi, with its cherished myth of a Lost Cause that ennobled the effort to tear our country apart over slavery, and that subsequently enabled Jim Crow legislation, spawned the KKK, and sanctioned a century of lynching and burning. There has been an uptick of attention to Faulkner owing to Carl Rollyson's recent two-volume biography (2020) and, especially for my purposes, Michael Gorra's The Saddest Words: William Faulkner's Civil War (2020), which focuses on the centrality of that cataclysm in his creative imagination and his historical vision.On more than one occasion Faulkner himself was emphatic in his own ambivalence toward "his native land," as in this self-description: "He was born of it and his bones will sleep in it; loving it even while hating some of it … the intolerance and injustice; the lynching of negroes not for the crimes they committed but because their skins were black" (in Blotner 2005, 354). Gorra (2020) argues that this very ambivalence is a generative resource for the author's greatest achievements, quoting Yeats's notorious dictum, "We make out of the quarrel with others, rhetoric, but of the quarrel with ourselves, poetry" (346). This can remind us of the notorious "crucible of doubt" out of which Dostoevsky allegedly forged his fiction. The Russian novelist is named (Blotner 2005, 718) as among seven of Faulkner's "masters" in the literary education of this omnivorous autodidact, with the others being Melville, Conrad, Balzac, Flaubert, Dickens, and Cervantes. With Dostoevsky especially he shares an admixture of horror and benign good humor. On occasion Faulkner was classed as an author of Southern Gothic, a label also applied to Flannery O'Connor, who, with Toni Morrison and Cormac McCarthy, counts among his greatest literary progeny. A more capacious designation might rank him with masters of the grotesque, as Mikhail Bakhtin has explored this anomalous category in his writings on Rabelais and Dostoevsky.Light in August (Faulkner, 1932) begins and ends on a humorous note, as we follow the quest of the guileless Lena Grove for the father of her unborn child. She has concluded from her "endless care of other children" in her brother's household, "'I reckon that's why I got one so quick myself'" (3); the novel closes with her newborn infant in her arms in her now aimless trek, marveling, "My, my. A body does get around: here we aint been coming from Alabama but two months, and now it's already Tennessee" (480).Lena's peregrinations bookend the story of Joe Christmas, so named because he was born on that day and who, we find later in the narrative, was snatched away by his religiously fanatical grandfather to be placed in an orphanage, then snatched away again to be placed... (shrink)

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. (...) J. The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

Part I of this two-part paper provided a broad overview of clinical and experimental findings bearing on the neural correlates of conscious processes. It was argued that several neurocognitive models related to: orienting to the outer world, dream sleep, and the integration of sensory-motor representations, converge upon a core ‘conscious system’, dubbed the extended reticular-thalamic activating system . The functions of the ERTAS, which shares extensive projections with the cerebral cortex, are mostly ‘implicit’, in contrast to the explicit representation of (...) conscious content within the neocortex. Part II expands this ERTAS model to encompass: the generation of coherent patterns of EEG activation, the integration of distributed cortical processes into a stream of unified percepts , and selective attention, as well as links between the ERTAS and systems providing the neural substrates for episodic memory and volition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC PRIDE AND LIBERAL VICE 1 PAUL J. WEITHMAN University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana L IBERALISM IS often portrayed, and sometimes portrays itself, as a moral and political view that rejects the claims of tradition. Thus liberals characteristically claim that the traditional standing of a social arrangement contributes little or nothing to its political legitimacy. Whether an arrangement is legitimate depends upon whether or not those who (...) currently live under it can understand and accept its rationale. Members of each generation must be able to examine arrangements as if they themselves were signatories of the social contract; the justification of regimes must, as it were, be susceptible of renewal in every age and to every citizen. Jefferson gave this view its most extreme expression when he claimed that each generation has the right to begin its nation's political life anew, and that national constitutions should be rewritten every two decades.2 Liberals often seem no kinder to intellectual than to political traditions. As they think political life can periodically begin anew, so they sometimes seem to think that political and moral philosophy can begin anew. Hobbes famously castigated the obscurities of scholasticism and argued that political philosophy could achieve firm footing only if the rubble of the past were swept away.3 Liberal contract theorists have followed Hobbes's lead, developing political theories that rely not at all upon classi1 Thanks to Alasdair Macintyre, David O'Connor, Michael Pakaluk, David Solomon, Eleonore Stump, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend, Prof. Judith Shklar. 2 See Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789 (The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Viking, 1977], 444ff.), as well as his lesser known missive to Samuel Kercheval of July 12, 1816 (ibid., SS2ff.). 3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 727, for an especially pungent expression of a view that runs throughout the Leviathan. 241 242 PAUL J. WEITHMAN cal and medieval moral philosophy. To take but one example of this neglect of the past, the ethical writings of scholasticism are dominated by richly detailed analyses of the virtues and vices, yet liberal writers roundly ignore these discussions. Liberals have been quick to defend their suspicions of the thought and politics of the past, but critics of liberalism have been equally quick to seize upon them. Champions of virtue ethics have been among the most vocal critics of liberalism in recent years, arguing that liberals court philosophical peril by neglecting the insights of earlier moral theories. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century opponent of liberalism, had an additional complaint. Burke discerned an arrogance in the liberal rejection of intellectual and political tradition. It was mere pride, Burke thought, to suppose that politics and political theory could be made transparent to the reason of every individual in the way that liberals sometimes claim.4 Burke's allegation that the liberal rejection of tradition reflects pride is ironic, for pride is a central element of one of the traditions of moral thought that liberals seem determined to reject. During a lengthy period of philosophy's history, pride was thought to be a motive of all wrong action. The biblical book of Sirach says that pride is the beginning of all evil5 and a long line of medieval moralists labored to explain how this might be so. Yet the tradition of moral thought that accorded pride so central a role now suffers from neglect at the hands of many philosophers. And pride itself is a vice that many philosophers now consider unworthy of attention. Most fail to consider it seriously as a motive for any wrong action at all. I have three aims in this paper. One is to examine pride's neglect more closely. I shall argue that pride suffers this neglect because of its centrality to a religiously based tradition of moral thought that many philosophers no longer accept. The alleged connection between pride and religion is, I shall argue, suggestive. It suggests what an account of pride would have to include 4 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on... (shrink)

Theories of autobiographical memory emphasise effortful, generative search processes in memory retrieval. However recent research suggests that memories are often retrieved directly, without effortful search. We investigated whether direct and generative retrieval differed in the characteristics of memories recalled, or only in terms of retrieval latency. Participants recalled autobiographical memories in response to cue words. For each memory, they reported whether it was retrieved directly or generatively, rated its visuo-spatial perspective, and judged its accompanying recollective experience. Our results indicated that (...) direct retrieval was commonly reported and was faster than generative retrieval, replicating recent findings. The characteristics of directly retrieved memories differed from generatively retrieved memories: directly retrieved memories had higher field perspective ratings and lower observer perspective ratings. However, retrieval mode did not influence recollective experience. We discuss our findings in terms of cue generation and content construction, and the implication for reconstructive models of autobiographical memory. (shrink)

Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...) of social defeat with our existing epistemological apparatus. (shrink)

A clear accurate translation of one of Plato's most facinating dialogues, with an extensive philosophical commentary.

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

Prior thinks that Edwards' argument depends on a metaphysical turn of phrase. Edwards, he says, subsumes "all happenings, or anyhow... all changes, under the idea of the 'beginning to be' either of concrete objects or of abstract ones". We are not to say, "My head began to ache," we are to say, "My headache began to exist." The shift may seem trivial, but actually it is "of the very first importance": Edwards' argument "depends on it." The reason is the following. (...) Edwards says that objects or substances cannot begin to be without a cause; that if they could, it would be prima facie implausible to hold that substances of only one kind, of all the millions of kinds of substance, should causelessly come to be; and that the implausibility cannot be removed by appealing to the nature of what thus comes to be, because until it actually exists there is nothing there to explain anything. Prior agrees with all that. But he holds that it is not impossible that some already existing substances should have a special kind of property which would make it possible for them to change or act causelessly. Of course, if we have to say that a change or an act is just another kind of coming to be of a substance, this too is impossible. Hence Prior thinks that by showing that changes and acts need not be construed as Edwards construes them, he will have made room for the possibility of limited indeterminism. (shrink)

Now it is tempting to try to generalize the view that means-ends considerations play a part in determining what is the right theory. It is tempting, that is, to try to use a similar view to give an account of the nature of truth or knowledge quite generally. For can we not say that truth is simply what we ought to believe, and that knowledge is what we are justified in believing? After all, terms like "true," "false," "probable," "doubtful," "known," (...) "believed," and so on, are not merely descriptive terms. They are used to evaluate the degree to which a belief or proposition is one which we ought to accept. And if in the case of so important an area of human knowledge as scientific theory what we ought to accept is determined in large part by means-ends considerations, may it not be true that in other areas of human knowledge means-ends considerations have a similar function? Perhaps it would even be possible to define truth, or knowledge, in terms of what serves some end or purpose. (shrink)

The role of microaggressions has gained increasing philosophical attention in recent years. However, microaggressions only tell part of the story. An often-overlooked component of inequality is the uneven and unjust distribution of microaffirmations. In this paper, I give a new definition of microaffirmations as signals that a recipient belongs to some valued or high-status class. Microaffirmations can—but need not—lead individuals to gain a sense of confidence, belonging, and merit. I then explain the harms of microaffirmations, arguing that when microaffirmations are (...) distributed inequitably, they can have larger ramifications for injustice, harming some vulnerable groups more than others. In addition, microaffirmations can lead individual actors to make choices based on who gives them microaffirmations and where they receive them, and thus can have outsized influence over the direction of an individual’s life because individuals tend to migrate to where they feel valued, appreciated, and included. I then turn to solutions to the problems I raise. I argue we should attend to and attempt to rectify inequalities in microaffirmations because doing so can help ensure not just the absence of negative attention, but also that the presence of positive attention is flowing in a just and equitable way. (shrink)

The path to consensus about physicians’ exercise of conscience was not linear. It looped back on itself as new insights illuminated earlier deliberations and in turn led to further insights. In particular, coming to agreement about physicians’ responsibility in regard to referral charted a route through many course corrections.